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ABSTRACT: The main argument is that the contemporary manifestations of right-wing populism in Europe ought to be 
understood, at least in part, as reactions to a distinctive form of postwar European society, which I will call here embed-
ded constitutional democracy. The argument is that the populist reaction to embedded constitutional democracy general-
ly takes a conservative form. This conservatism is expressed in rather different ways (ranging from ethnoreligious views 
to ‘illiberal liberal’ ones), but at the same time populism displays a shared core of criticisms on liberalism, and in particu-
lar regarding the internationalized or global version of liberalism. In the article, I will start with a brief analysis of the 
emergence of postwar society in the form of embedded constitutional democracy, used as a backcloth for the subse-
quent discussion of critical views of liberal understandings of the law in conservative populist thinking. I will, then, focus 
on populists’ critical views of liberalism and ‘globalism’, analyzed in the form of contemporary articulations of (conserva-
tive) populism in both East-Central Europe (Hungary and Poland), and Western Europe (France, Italy, the Netherlands). 
In order to identify ideological affinities and critical positions, I discuss four themes: abstractness and inauthenticity, 
identity threat, domination, and legal fundamentalism. 
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The main argument in the article is that the contemporary manifestations of right-wing populism in Eu-
rope ought to be understood, at least in part, as reactions to a distinctive form of postwar European society, 
which I will call here embedded constitutional democracy
1
, that is, a multilateral system of societies charac-
terized by constitutional democracy, universal human rights, various levels of juridification (as inter alia ex-
pressed in the role of apex courts) and international (legal) interdependence and integration. The argument is 
that the populist reaction to embedded constitutional democracy, as based on a liberal understanding of de-
mocracy, and as grounded in the rule of law and universal human rights, generally takes a conservative form. 
This conservatism is expressed in different ways (as becomes clear, for instance, from different approaches 
to human rights by rightwing populist movements in Eastern and Western Europe), but a shared set of criti-
cisms on liberalism, and in particular on the liberal, internationalized juridical project of society is equally 
evident, as will be shown in the article. 
The argument in the article is grounded in a socio-legal understanding of modern democracy, which is in 
significant contrast to those approaches, not least prominent  in political science, but equally so in constitu-
tional law, which tend to take liberal democracy, and its juridical structures, for granted.
2
 Here, while law is 
understood as an intrinsic part of the social relations in modern societies, it is acknowledged that the role, 
and particular manifestations, of law in society differ from society to society as well as change over time. In 
this regard, ‘embedded constitutional democracy’ as it developed in post-war Europe is understood as a dis-
tinctive political-legal project, in which law and judicial institutions have become ever more prominent, and 
in turn are increasingly embedded in international and transnational legal regimes through processes of jurid-
ification (the extension of law in society) and judicialization (the growing prominence of judicial institu-
tions). The main argument in the article is that the recent manifestations of right-wing populism in Europe 
 
1 The inspiration comes from John Ruggie’s ‘embedded liberalism’, (Ruggie 1982). As Ruggie argues, ‘The liberalism that 
was restored after World War II differed in kind from that which had been known previously’, in that ‘unlike the economic 
nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character’ (392-3). Perhaps more relevant is, however, Jan-Werner 
Mueller’s notion of ‘constrained democracy’: Jan-Werner Müller states: [in the postwar era] ‘no known set of institutions in 
any way “returned” and neither was “liberalism” in any nineteenth-century sense (as a matter of ideas, let alone in terms of a 
social base) revived after 1945. What emerged instead might best be described as a new balance of democracy and liberal 
principles, and constitutionalism in particular, but with both liberalism and democracy redefined in the light of the totalitarian 
experience of midtwentieth-century Europe. While many of the central institutions and values of the post-war period could be 
seen as functional equivalents of certain liberal ideas, the inherited political languages of liberalism were almost universally 
rejected as relativistic, or simply unsuitable for the age of mass democracy. In other words, in post-war Western Europe a 
new, chastened Weberian politics triumphed: not charismatic, but firmly centred on the executive and pragmatic leaders; not 
geared towards generating meaning, but based on more than economic success (namely, moral foundations, such as natural 
law); not animated by a comprehensive liberal vision, but attempting to integrate citizens through shared values rooted in a 
rejection of the fascist past and the Communist threat from the East in the present’ (Müller 2011: 129). 
2
 For a critical discussion of populism with regard to both political science and constitutional law, see Oklopcic 2019. As 
Oklopcic aptly argues: a ‘theory of populism is a theory for those who are either committed to the idea of liberal democracy in 
practice, or for those who are unwilling to reconsider the meaning of that idea in theory’ (204). For a critical discussion of po-
litical science approaches, see (De la Torre and O. Mazzoleni 2019). There are, surely, exceptions, such as the work of Bojan 
Bugaric (e.g. Bugaric 2019). 
 




are a critical reaction against this post-war liberal-legal project. The populist legal mindset does not reject the 
law as such,  but rather understands the role and the nature of law in a radically different manner from the 
prevalent postwar convention of modern constitutionalism, which is grounded in legal liberalism and anti-
totalitarianism. 
The first claim, and point of departure, in this article is that European  societies in the post-1945 period 
relatively converged towards a particular form, that of embedded constitutional democracy, in which signifi-
cant processes of juridification of modern societies are manifest (Croce 2018),  and in which  the signifi-
cance of law, human rights,  also constitutional law, and judicial institutions has importantly increased, to the 
detriment of, among others, politics and political institutions (Hirschl 2004; Stone Sweet 2008). A second 
claim is that recent manifestations of populism, since in particular the early 2000s, can be understood as in-
cluding an important component of critique on this model of embedded constitutional democracy, which is 
inter alia understood as leading to an excessive juridification of society. Populist forces form a counter-
reaction and converge on forms of what I will call ‘legal cynicism’ or also ‘legal scepticism’ towards prevail-
ing understandings of liberal law and the rule of law
3
.  Such scepticism is itself significantly informed by 
conservative positions on the law. I should stress that populist legal scepticism or legal resentment targets 
‘liberal legalism’ or ‘legal liberalism’, that is, a distinctive liberal understanding of the law, or better still, a 
specific combination of liberalism and legalism.
4
 Legal scepticism hence refers to a critique of what is per-
ceived as an excessive form of legalism, not of the law as such. 
While there is an extensive discussion on the positions of rightwing populism on, amongst others, migra-
tion, national identity, European integration, and party politics, there is little systematic attention to their un-
derstanding of the law.
5
 The argument in this article is that this is unfortunate, as a not negligible part of the 
populists’ political actions and discourses as well as critiques can be related to a distinctive legal critique, 
which identifies key problems in contemporary societies as related to an allegedly excessive presence of the 
law. In this, (rightwing) populism tends to take a critical or ‘cynical’ approach to liberal understandings of 
law, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. Elsewhere, and more in general, I have called this legal mindset 
‘legal resentment’ (Blokker 2019).  
In the article, I will start with a brief analysis of the emergence of postwar society in the form of embed-
ded constitutional democracy, used as a backcloth for the subsequent discussion of critical views of liberal 
understandings of the law in conservative populist thinking. I will, in this, focus on both Western and East-
Central European populists. Populists’ critical views of liberalism and ‘globalism’ will be analyzed in the 
form of contemporary articulations of (conservative) populism in East-Central Europe, as particularly mani-
fest in Hungary and Poland, and in Western populist discourse (France, Italy, and the Netherlands), including 




 Legal cynicism (as used in a very different study, that is, on deviance amongst different minority groups in American socie-
ty, Sampson & Jeglum Bartusch, entails ‘cynicism about the rules of society and their application’, and relates to the ‘lack of 
support for the regulations of larger society’ (782). 
4
 The populist vision dovetails with critical scholarly views of forms of liberalism. As John Gray has argued, ‘[c]urrent [liber-
al] orthodoxies treat the law as an accomplished fact. By passing over the political conditions that make the rule of law possi-
ble, the legalist liberalism that has prevailed over the past generation has been able to represent law as a free-standing institu-
tion. It has contrived to disregard that the institution of the law always depends on the power of the state’ (Gray 1995: 131-2).  
5
 Some important exceptions should be acknowledged, that is, in socio-legal and criminological studies of the distinctive area 
of criminal law and ‘penal populism’ (Pratt and M. Miao 2019; Pratt 2020). 





2. The Juridification of Modern Societies 
 
Modern societies have from early on been perceived as closely related to the ideas of universal human 
rights and constitutions as their central dimensions, an observation often followed by a reference to article 16 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789: ‘A society in which the observance of the 
law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no constitution at all’. The significance of the 
constitutional dimension remained evident throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not least in na-
tional independence struggles, but it can be argued that it is most prominently so after the Second World War 
that constitutionalism – understood in a very distinctive, legalistic manner – becomes understood as an es-
sential component of the overall constitution of modern, democratic societies.  
The postwar period is of special interest for a sociological perspective on juridification and constitutions: 
one may observe a clear break with the earlier prevalent understanding of modern constitutions as deeply 
grounded in local political communities or the people, an idea expressed clearly in the works of scholars 
such as Savigny or Hegel (cf. Madsen and Thornhill 2014: 1). After 1945, constitutionalism increasingly be-
came understood as a universalistic political programme, in which national societies become intimately part 
of an international scheme of legal norms and principles. In this process, judicial institutions taken on an in-
creasingly important position in modern societies, as exemplified by the growing importance of independent 
higher and constitutional courts. 
The postwar period stands out in the novel imagination of democratic orders as strongly grounded in judi-
cial institutions, the rule of law, and constitutional frameworks, in a narrative which identifies an independ-
ent and depoliticized constitutional and rights-based order as the most robust antidote to totalitarianism. The 
distinctive societal role of constitutions becomes the guarantee of order and stability, not least by means of a 
deliberate narrowing of the space of politics through juridification of some of its most essential aspects,
6
 but 
also due to the fact that national constitutional orders in Europe are increasingly embedded in international 
legal regimes,  such as the human rights regime of the European Convention of Human Rights on the one 
hand, and the (economic) legal norms of the European integration project, on the other. The new understand-
ing of constitutionalism, often labelled ‘legal constitutionalism’ (Blokker 2013; Sajó and Uitz 2017)  or ‘new 
constitutionalism’ (Hirschl 2004; Gyorfi 2016) entails, in the words of Gyorfi, a limiting of the constitutional 
imagination, in that a distinctive constitutional model becomes the general blueprint for all countries to fol-
low, without much deeper reflection on its local relevance or potential alternatives (Gyorfi 2016: 30-33).  
A major expression of this narrowing of the constitutional imagination regards the active promotion of a 
legal-constitutional model in the European context. This is not only due to a specific approach to post-
totalitarian transition (as in Germany and Italy), or the latter’s reflection in the EU enlargement policies (as 
in the cases of the Mediterranean countries in the 1970s and 80s and the East-Central European countries in 
the 1990s), but also a result of the specific development of European integration itself, in which courts with a 
strong constitutional character have played an increasingly prominent role (Ferejohn 2002: 42). Such courts 
limit the ‘capacities of national political institutions to make and implement domestic and international poli-
cy’ (Ferejohn 2002: 42). The European trajectory of integration takes a specific, and it will be suggested, 
one-sidedly, legalistic form in which judicial institutions and actors are upfront (at least until the 2007 crisis), 
 
6
 E.g. human rights, cf. Ferejohn 2002. 




and in which legal and constitutional instruments are utilized to further build up a European order.
7
 As ar-
gued by Kate Nash,  
 
For more than 50 years – albeit in fits and starts – legal constitutionalism, the view that rights are de-
politicised by referring disputes over their interpretation to constitutional courts, and that other branches of the 
state must defer to judges’ decisions, has been the dominant model through which human rights are to be 
achieved in Europe. As a result, there is now effectively a kind of European constitution (Nash 2016: 1296). 
 
It is this distinctive, liberal and legal-constitutional model that right-wing populists criticize, using a range 
of critical arguments. Right-wing populists, as we will see below, often take a conservative position, defend-
ing a traditional perspective of the community, which is now allegedly threatened by universalistic, abstract, 
and ever-expanding norms and rights. 
 
 
3. A Populist Backlash in Europe 
 
As argued above, a significant postwar trend is the emergence of distinctive constitutional democratic re-
gimes, importantly embedded in an international system of human rights and political and legal integration 
and grounded in a rationale of anti-totalitarianism. In the Western European context, a main critique on em-
bedded constitutional democracy is formulated in terms of ‘globalism’ and ‘sovereigntism’, both arguments 
often promoted by populists. Globalism is a term used to criticize universalist understandings of modern so-
ciety and the alleged subjugation of societies to forces external to itself, in primis, international and transna-
tional political and legal regimes (in particular the European Union, but also the European Convention of 
Human Rights and its institutions). Sovereigntism is a political perspective which strongly prioritizes the na-
tion-state, and in particular the idea of a historical nation and its identity and traditions. A further, and strong-
ly related, critique is that of liberalism, understood as the main ideological vehicle of globalism and as sup-
porting a ‘progressive hegemony’ (Vossen 2011), and hence decried for its alleged monopolistic position in 
political thought and politics, but also as providing the main building blocks for embedded constitutional 
democracy in the form of rights equality, multi-culturalism and the protection of minorities. Liberalism is of-
ten understood in rather loose terms
8
 in the populist critique and is frequently equated with neo-liberal ideas 
of the market, as well as cosmopolitan, universalist ideas regarding European integration, human rights, and 
’open society’. Liberalism is frequently counterposed to the native culture, historical roots, and traditions of 
the local community.  
In many postwar societies in Western Europe, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
UK, clear forms of ‘backlash politics’ have emerged, in which core principles of the universalistic, liberal-
constitutional model of the postwar years, grounded in extensive of human rights and minority protection, 
are heavily contested (Oomen 2016; Thornhill 2019). The cases that will be discussed here are France (Ras-
 
7
 Apart from a legalistic bias, it is equally important to stress a ‘market bias’, in that distinctive market rights have taken prec-
edence in specific phases of European integration (see Blokker 2019; Brunkhorst 2016). This indicates a broader link between 
law, human rights, and the ascendence of neoliberalism (as decried by inter alia Moyn 2018 and Marks 2013). 
8
 Ryszard Legutko, a prominent intellectual in the Polish Law and Justice party, discerns a common dimension to different 
expressions of liberalism, ranging from ‘radical free market capitalism to certain forms of the welfare state, from Ludwig von 
Mises to John Rawls, from Reaganomics to the European Union’ (Legutko 2008: 7). 




semblement National), Italy (Lega), and the Netherlands (Partij voor de Vrijheid; Forum voor Democratie).
9
 
The emergence of anti-progressive, in distinctive ways anti-liberal, political forces has often been labelled as 
populist, but in this the emphasis has been predominantly placed on style, strategy, and rhetoric, while the 
underlying ideological, ideational dimensions have been frequently ignored (Oudenampsen 2018). This re-
gards for instance the case of the Netherlands, where a pioneering, progressive democratic regime underwent 
a significant conservative turn in the early 2000s (Oudenampsen 2018; Vossen 2011). If ideational dimen-
sions to ‘backlash politics’ remain understudied, this is even more the case with the legal dimensions of pop-
ulism.
10
 As argued, in the extensive debates on rightwing populism there is hardly any attention for populist 
positions on law, human rights, ands constitutionalism. I will however argue that in various cases, including 
Western Europe, populists formulate a relatively broad critique on the ‘rule of law state’ and of liberal, legal 
ideas (Hirsch Ballin 2011).  
In North-Western Europe, this frequently includes the phenomenon of what Moffitt describes as ‘illiberal 
liberalism’, that is, ‘parties combine policies that are undeniably xenophobic and putatively anti-liberal with 
at times classically liberal positions in other policy areas’ (Moffitt 2017: 114). In the ideational analysis pro-
posed here, this refers to the simultaneous endorsement of sovereigntist and anti-globalist positions, on one 
hand, and the favouring of rights for distinctive ‘in-groups’ (women, homosexuals), on the other. In other 
words, rights are seen as strictly related to a distinctive political community and its ‘own’ in-groups, refuting, 
in this, a universalistic approach. The illiberal liberal or ‘civilizationist’ form of populism, on the face of it, 
appears in great contrast with conservative, religious positions as found (increasingly) in the Italian Lega, or 
in the Polish Law and Justice party. While this contrast is evident, in reality there is, as we will see, a signifi-
cant overlap in anti-universalist and sovereigntists positions towards the law in both religious and secular 
forms of populism.  
As emerges from the discussion below, it appears evident that the universalist, liberal project and its un-
derstanding of  the law, in particular regarding international, EU law, and human rights, is being contested 
throughout Europe (as  for instance in the case of Brexit) (Oomen 2016; Madsen 2019), even if the populist 
backlash is more acute in East-Central European countries - to which I will turn now - especially in terms of 
authoritarian tendencies in populism-in-government.  
A number of the ‘new democracies’ in East-Central Europe (ECE) have witnessed a clear form of political 
backlash in recent years. The ECE-region, made up of countries that made a transition to liberal democracy 
relatively recently, provides an important set of examples regarding both the institutionalization of embedded 
constitutional democracy (since 1989) and in terms of a societal and political reaction in the form of populist 
critiques of the liberal understanding of the law. In fact, the post-communist countries form particularly im-
portant examples, because these societies have seen both a strong tendency towards juridification since 1989 
- in terms of constitutionalization, the extension of human rights and other legal regimes, and the rise of 
prominent courts - and a strong, relatively recent, populist backlash. In particular the cases of Hungary 
(Fidesz) and Poland (PiS) have seen a radical backlash in recent years.  
 
9
 The German Alternative für Deutschland will also be briefly mentioned. 
10
 The term ‘backlash’ originally refers to the conservative backlash in the United States, which emerged in particular against 
the legal dimensions of progressivism, not least in the form of Supreme Court rulings. 




Originally, the momentous changes in ECE around the year 1989 were widely understood as ‘legal revolu-
tions’ or ‘legalistic revolutions’,
11
 and as ushering in the transformation of the former communist countries 
towards liberal-democratic regimes. Currently, however close to 30 years since the regime change, the region 
witnesses a strong backlash in the form of a counter-revolution by law or counter-constitutionalism (Schep-
pele 2017; Sledzinska-Simon 2017). Observers identify in particular in Hungary and Poland constitutional 
‘capture’ by populist forces as well as a defiance of and attack on judicial institutions, in the name of popular 
sovereignty and a strong critique of liberalism.  
In the extensive debates on ‘backsliding’ in the region, relatively little attention is paid to the ideational 
foundations and forms of critique present in populist counter-constitutional projects, their relation to long-
standing conservative narratives on liberal democracy, and the distinctive telos of populist politics. As Ewa 
Dąbrowska argues for the case of Poland, ‘There is scant academic literature on the ideas behind the political 
change realized by PiS since 2015’ (Dąbrowska 2018: 93). In short, populist approaches to the law need 
careful investigation, as populists criticize liberal views of the law, propose different relations to the law, and 
manage to mobilize significant social support in favour of their populist projects.  




 - despite significant dif-
ferences between East and West with regard to for instance democratic consolidation, issues of democratic 
transition, and forms of nationalism - need to be understood as conservative reactions to what is perceived as 
liberal-legalist domination (identified in domestic democratic institutions as well in supranational ones). In 
both ECE and WE, conservative intellectuals and civil society groups have been gathering strength since the 
1990s, and in particular since the early 2000s. Conservative forces have increasingly radicalized, and have 
become significant political forces, mobilizing society, and providing intellectual support, expertise, and le-
gitimacy to populist projects. As Balázs Trencsényi and his colleagues have argued with regard to ECE:  
 
The radicalization of conservatism, which characterized the political and discursive landscape of the region 
after 2000, can be properly understood only in relation to the liberal ascendance of the 1990s. This is not only 
because neoconservatives constructed their own identity in opposition to liberalism, but also because their ef-
forts to define the political divide in terms of exclusive cultural-ideological dichotomies can be traced back to 
the postdissident discourse, defining liberal politics in terms of a broad consensus (Trencsényi 2018: 277). 
 
It is in my view crucial to analyse distinctive manifestations of rightwing populism as distinctive political 
projects that mobilize anti-liberal, conservative forces in society and to elucidate such populist rhetoric and 
 
11
  Jiří Přibáň, for instance, spoke of the ‘fiction of legal revolutions’ (Přibáň 2002: 89), and together with Wojciech Sadurksi 
of a ‘self-limiting and legalistic revolution’ (Přibáň and Sadurski 2006: 299). The former Chief Judge of the Hungarian Con-
stitutional Court László Sólyom related to the ‘revolution under the rule of law’ (Sólyom 2003). 
12
 I am not implying that this is the case in the same manner throughout the region. While the Hungarian and Polish cases fit 
our discussion neatly, manifestations of populism elsewhere appear different. The Czech populism of Andrej Babiš is for in-
stance often defined as ‘technopopulism’, lacking in a strong nationalist or conservative component (cf. Havlík 2019). In the 
case of Romania, the populism of the governing PSD has appeared as less conservative and nationalist. 
13
 As is visible in the political projects of the Italian Lega, the French Rassemblement National (cf. Fournier 2019), or the 
Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (cf. Mazzoleni and Voermans, this issue; Oomen 2016) and Forum voor Democratie. 












While many observers regard right-wing populists as opportunistic, cynical, and power-grabbing politi-
cians, it is difficult to deny that there is a distinctive normative and ‘ideological’ thrust to the discourse and 
policies of populist governments, such as those of the Fidesz and PiS, but also of, for instance, the Dutch 
Partij voor de Vrijheid or the Italian Lega. The roots of many of the populist constitutional projects in Europe 
lie in their ideational bases of anti-liberalism and conservatism (Scheppele 2019; Csillag and Szelenyi 2015; 
Jasiecki 2018; Grzebalska and Pető 2018). Populists single out liberalism as the main enemy and display it as 
‘evil and threatening’.
15
 Anti-liberalism forms in this a core dimension of the ideational foundations of con-
servative populism.  
The relation between rightwing populism and conservatism is a prominent one, but as of yet not sufficient-
ly discussed. Admittedly, conservatism knows many varieties. Yet, a few central dimensions of conservatism 
can be identified (O’Sullivan 2015: 346). Conservatives strongly question the optimistic Enlightenment be-
lief in progress and in the malleability of society according to rational design. Conservatives tend to appreci-
ate traditional, spontaneous social ties, a collective societal identity, emphasize culture as a prominent di-
mension of social integration, and claim to want to save an existing, ‘authentic’ community. In addition, and 
as O’Sullivan has observed, conservatism in its reactionary version relates to an ‘essentially utopian vision of 
a perfectly harmonious hierarchical society’ (O’Sullivan 2015: 348).  
In Western Europe, populists decry that the ‘oikos’, ‘what is one’s own’ (Baudet 2013: 68), is ‘being de-
stroyed by a range of phenomenona’, including ‘multiculturalism and open borders’, ‘the European Union, 
which takes away the self-control of the inhabitants of our country and sets up a bureaucracy which can 
overrule national parliaments in practically any point’ (Baudet 2013: 68). The right-wing populist Thierry 
Baudet of the Dutch Forum voor Democratie follows Roger Scruton in denouncing this as ‘oikophobia’. 
Baudet, inspired by the Spenglerian thesis of the Untergang des Abendlandes, has further promoted the view 
that ‘someone has to save the Netherlands—and Western civilization—from their impending downfall’ (Fa-
ber 2018)  and wants to defend local Dutch culture from the assault of foreign enemies and the EU. 
Similarly, Geert Wilders of the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (the Freedom Party) argued in 2005 in fa-
vour of the abolishment of article 1 of the Dutch Constitution, which refers to freedom of expression and 
non-discrimination, and proposed to revise it so that it referred to the ‘dominant culture’ of the Netherlands, 
the judeo-christian tradition and humanism. And in the presidential campaign of Marine Le Pen, she put for-
ward the following proposition: 
 
The defence of national identity, [and] the values and traditions of French civilization. To inscribe into the 
Constitution, the defence and the promotion of our historical and cultural patrimony…The promotion of secu-
larism and the fight against communitarianism. Inscribe into the Constitution the principle: «The Republic 
 
14
 The – now collapsed - ‘yellow-green’ populist coalition of the Lega and the Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy is a good ex-
ample, in that it pursued policies against universal, individual human rights (for instance, in migration policy), criticized pow-
erful judicial institutions, displayed scepticism towards minority rights, and openly defied the European integration project. 
15
 Wolff-Powęska (2018: 59). Krzysztof Jasiecki speaks of a ‘“conservative modernization” strategy’ (Jasiecki 2018). 




does not recognize any [ethnic, religious] community». Restore secularism everywhere, extend it to the entire 
public sphere, and inscribe it into Labour Law (Le Pen 2017). 
 
Matteo Salvini of the Italian Lega defends Italy by emphasising its Christian religion and traditions against 
(liberal) multiculturalism and Islamic influences (Schwörer 2018), while on the European level seeking alli-
ances with conservative populist parties, such as by means of the conclusion of a common programme with 
the Polish PiS (and other such parties) in the context of the European elections of 2019 on ‘development, 
family, and the Christian roots of Europe’.
16
 
In East-Central Europe, Polish conservatives
17
 regard liberalism, in its promotion of modernity, Western 
civilization, grounded in moral decline, consumerist thinking and a negatively understood pluralism and mul-
ticulturalism, is undermining culture, religion, and national identity (Wolff-Powęska 2018: 59). In Hungary, 
a similar conservative mindset is upfront in public debate as well as in politics.
18
 In the words of Frank 
Furedi, the ‘political outlook of Fidesz is best described as a synthesis of conservative nationalism and Chris-
tian democracy’ (Furedi 2017: 5).  
A more systematic analysis of the ideas underpinning conservative populism in Europe appears fruitful. A 
key dimension in this might be a primary interest in an analysis of conservative populism’s critical stance 
towards liberal understandings of the law and liberal constitutionalism. Such an exercise is important for a 
number of reasons: it enhances our understanding of how (rightwing) populists perceive the law, it gives in-
sight in which dimensions of liberal legalism are considered problematic by populists, and it might help us 




5. The Conservative Populist Critique on Liberal Legalism 
 
An analysis of the general critique on liberalism raised by conservative thinkers provides important in-
sights into rightwing, conservative populist approaches to the law, but equally into problematic dimensions 
of taken-for-granted liberal understandings of the law or the ‘limits of the law’ (Sumption 2016). The claim 
here is not that rightwing populists necessarily share all such conservative views of society. Rather, the ar-
gument is that rightwing populism - both in its more conservative, religious guise (prevalent in East-Central 
Europe but not only there)  and in its ‘illiberal liberal’ version (evident in North-Western Europe) – displays 
a similarly critical approach towards liberal legalism/liberal universalism: as an abstract, disembedded, arti-






 It is important, but beyond the scope of this article, to recognize important differences between conservatives in ECE. 
Whereas some, such as Ryszard Legutko and András Lánczi, have strongly criticized liberal constitutionalism, individual 
rights, and related judicial institutions (such as independent apex courts), others, such as István Stumpf, take a more moderate 
position. Lech Morawski, one of the ‘pseudo-judges’ of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (deceased in 2017), endorsed a 
view of ‘judicial restraint’, in which the Constitutional Tribunal takes a less active role and parliament (and government) be-
come more prominent. See, in general, for extensive discussions of different conservative currents (Matyja 215; Dąbrowska 
2018; Trencsenyi et al. 2018, chapter 6). 
18
 Kim Scheppele has discussed the anti-liberal ideology of the Hungarian Fidesz party in-depth (see Scheppele 2019).  




In the version of ‘sovereigntism’, prevailing in Western European countries such as France and Italy, this 
conservative dimension comes through in a strong instance on the rights of the European peoples, sovereign-
ty of the people as a priority, and the denunciation of the abstract individual rights on which also the EU is 
allegedly built. This argument is for instance made by Paolo Becchi, a professor of philosophy and author of 
the Manifesto Sovranista. Per la liberazione dei popoli europei (Becchi 2019: 18-9), initially close to the 
Italian Five Star Movement, but now considered near to Salvini’s Lega. In the conservative views of Thierry 
Baudet, the recently emerged intellectual-cum-populist in the Netherlands (who holds a PhD in law from the 
University of Leiden, supervised by Paul Cliteur and Roger Scruton), it is the insistence of Western liberal 
societies on individual, inalienable rights that weakens traditional social institutions such as the family, the 
nation, and traditions as such (Baudet 2019).  
In the context of anti-communist and anti-liberal ideas of conservative thinkers in East-Central Europe, 
one significant example is the work of Ryszard Legutko (a Polish political theorist and a Member of Europe-
an Parliament for the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS)). In his work, liberalism is denounced as displaying 
suspicion towards collective societal institutions, such as the family, while human rights are frequently un-
derstood as arbitrary claims of specific political groups raised against the common good (cf. Legutko 2016). 
Another significant example is András Lánczi, a political philosopher and the ‘more-or-less official regime 
philosopher’ of the Hungarian Fidesz party (Scheppele 2019: 317). In the period 2010-16, Lánczi headed the 
Fidesz-related conservative think tank Századvég. He has been the Director of the Institute of Political Sci-
ence and Philosophy at Corvinus University and is currently its rector. Lánczi equally criticizes liberalism 
and liberal constitutionalism in the name of what he calls ‘political realism’ (Lánczi 2015). In a manner simi-
lar to that of Legutko, Lánczi equates liberalism with communism, denouncing what he identifies as a ‘totali-
tarian’ thrust of both in the name of a utopian view of society. He further criticizes liberalism for its role in 
undermining the community and the excessive focus on the rights of the individual (Lánczi 2015). 
In order to identify ideological affinities and critical positions between different manifestations of 
rightwing populism, grounded in conservative positions, below I will discuss a number of reccuring themes 
and claims that appear in various populist arguments and discourses, in both East and West. The four themes 
I will analyse are: abstractness and inauthenticity, identity threat, domination, and legal fundamentalism. 
 
 
5.1 Abstractness and inauthenticity 
 
A key dimension of the populist critique is the claim that liberalism is an abstract and inauthentic ideolo-
gy, which is incapable of interacting with ‘thick’ or ‘real’ community life. Liberalism’s insistence on ab-
stract, universalist, individual human rights pushes it further and further away from the real life-forms of 
family and society.
19
 Conservative populists tend to understand the liberal approach as merely a ‘thin’ one, in 
that it allegedly understands thicker, cultural, non-procedural or more substantive ideas a matter of private or 
group preferences, which ought not to be part of public politics. Legutko’s argument is, for instance, that lib-
eralism ‘lacks in weight’, which seems a version of the well-known critique of liberalism as a formal-
procedural idea, which portrays liberalism as a dispassionate, instrumentalist view of politics. According to 
Legutko, this also means that liberalism – in its ‘sterility’ - has little if anything to say about substantive, 
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human moral questions; indeed, liberalism for him is ‘comparably simplistic and equally impoverishing’ [as 
was communist thought].
20
  While liberal rules are of a procedural, universalist, and inclusive kind, this 
comes at the cost, according to Legutko, of ‘being more and more remote from reality’.
21
  
This idea is echoed in the Dutch politician-cum-intellectual and leader of the populist Forum voor 
Democratie Thierry Baudet’s critique of universalism as denying particular identities in the name of an ab-
stract, universalist understanding of rationality. The impact of liberalism on society means that it increasing-
ly undermines ‘social hierarchies, customs, traditions, and practices that existed prior to the emergence of the 
new system’ [i.e. liberal democracy] (Legutko 2016: 131). In the view of Baudet, liberalist universalism 
leads to a system in which particularist differences are banalized (while all social groups are supposedly 
equal in an ‘all-inclusiveness of loyalties’ (Baudet 2012), while core identities (such as the Dutch identity) 
are marginalized because of the multicultural arrangement (Baudet 2012; cf. Cliteur 2018: 293). In this, 
Baudet understands liberalism as subject to a series of ‘universalist fallacies’. Drawing inter alia on John 
Rawls’ political liberalism, Baudet indicates that one of the universalist fallacies is that liberal ideals (in a 
version of the ‘globalist’ critique, understood in the form of ‘supranationalism and multiculturalism’) (Bau-
det 2012: 202), form abstract and ‘ ‘objective’ criteria of justice” and are, in his view, hence unrelated to or 
too much disembedded from specific, particularistic societies (Baudet 2012: 203). 
For Paolo Becchi, an intellectual close to the Lega, liberalism always presupposes that the ‘holder of rights 
is, and can only be, the singular individual, the singular person in the abstract… We have forgotten that men 
never exist only “by themselves”, they do not live on an island of Robinsonian memory, but they live in fam-
ilies, communities, peoples, all with their own traditions, customs, conventions. We have forgotten that states 
are not abstract entities, but the concrete, existential expression of the political will of particular peoples’ 
(Becchi 2019: 18).  
 
 
5.2 Threat to Identity 
 
Rightwing populists tend to understand distinctive rights (such as minority and religious rights) as one the 
main vehicles through which national identity is being undermined. A key problem for conservatives is lib-
eralism’s insistence on egalitarianism, which, as argued by the Polish philospher Legutko, renders ‘all social 
hierarchies [as] immediately problematic because they were, obviously, not natural’ (Legutko 2016: 132). 
The egalitarian drive in liberalism, grounded in the idea of individual rights, means that no part of society is 
safe from liberalism’s political interference: 
 
People might generally agree that they are all equal before the law, but this will not dispel the concerns of a 
dedicated egalitarian, who will argue that this principle is too abstract to be sufficient in every instance. After 
all, even if we respect equality before the law, other types of inequality and domination continue to exist and 
their existence is morally repugnant and cannot be tolerated. He will then add that the persistence of inequality 
and domination has its origin in their being moored in people’s customs and habits, which – as can be expected 




 Legutko (2016: 118). One can find a similar argument in Lánczi’s work. 
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According to this communitarian critique of liberalism, the liberal tendency to root out all forms of ine-
quality, including those of religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities, leads to the destruction of existing social 
communities and their ‘thick’ identities: ‘Because egalitarianism weakens communities and thus deprives 
men of an identity-giving habitat, it creates a vacuum around them’.
22
  In the words of the Hungarian philos-
opher András Lánczi, the utopian ideas of liberalism ‘want to get rid of everything that is rooted in be-
queathed processes. Utopian ideas are against all traditions, which is frightening and useless’ (Lánczi 2015: 
ix). 
Significantly different versions of this critique can be found. In the case of Marine Le Pen and the Front 
National (now Rassemblement National (RN)), including in Le Pen’s recent presidential campaign in 2017, 
‘communautarisme’ (which refers to the granting of distinctive group rights to minority groups in France, in-
cluding religious (in particular muslims) as well as a sexual minorities) is denounced as a threat to French 
national unity. The latter is based on the idea that ‘France is a very old human and legal creation. Nothing 
is there by chance. Secularism is how we handled religious conflicts that had plunged our country into a 
bloodbath’ (Reid and Le Pen 2016). The extension of rights in the name of egalitarianism and non-
discrimination jeopardizes this ‘very old human and legal creation’ and leads to the ‘tyranny of the minority’, 
which threatens existing French traditions and identity (Fournier 2019; Eltchaninoff 2017). In an interesting 
twist, Le Pen criticizes ‘communautarisme’ in the name of secularism and ‘laïcité’ (Le Pen 2017; Almeida 
2017). She argues that ‘the Islamic fundamentalists cannot accept [the rules of secularism], for one simple 
reason, which is that they consider sharia to be superior to all other laws and norms, including the French 
constitution. That's unacceptable’ (Reid and Le Pen 2016). In the past, the Front National has engaged, in the 
municipalities where it was governing, in cutting the funding for organizations that promote minority and re-
ligious rights. In a complex twist, and in someways akin to what Moffitt indicates in Northern European 
countries as ‘illiberal liberalism’ (Moffitt 2017), the RN promotes French republican egalitarianism and its 
emphasis on universalist rights against the particularistic idea of the extension of minority rights. As the 
young secretary-general of RN has argued: ‘We want to revive the principle of a Republic which guarantees 
the equality of rights among its citizens and which allows philosophical and religious freedoms’. For RN, 
this does not at all mean ‘putting all religions on an equal footing’.
23
 
The various Dutch manifestations of populism appear to be of a sui generis kind (for instance, in the more 
active promotion of a Dutch culture of tolerance for sexual minorities and LGBT rights), but at the same time 
display affinities with this critique of liberal egalitarianism.
24
 From one perspective, what unites all rightwing 
populist approaches, in both East and West, is an insistence on the preservation of an allegedly distinctive 
national identity (explicitly grounded in Christianity in the cases of Hungary, Poland, but also Italy, while 
related to Christianity in a more implicit way in the secularist, ‘civilizational’ versions (Brubaker 2017)  in 
the Netherlands and France). One key dimension that unites East and West is the identified enemy of Islam, 
as a principal threat for Western Christianity and civilization. In both East and West, the liberal-democratic 
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state is understood as a facilitator of the spread of Islam, through its tolerant approach, expressed through a 
pluralistic understanding of democracy, minority rights, and open borders. In the terms of Thierry Baudet, 
the ‘Rechtsstaat’ or human-rights based, constitutional democracy ‘limits the majority’. It constitutes a 
‘break on the popular will, [and provides] a guarantee for minorities’ (Baudet 2013: 1609). The thrust of the 
argument seems to be that too many rights granted to minorities (related to religious symbols and customs 
for instance) may lead to the undermining of the majority culture and identity. According to Baudet, the con-
servative tradition, in contrast, defends the ‘conventions of the ordinary people, the prejudices of ordinary 
man’ (Baudet 2013: 1626). A further thrust in the argument, shared amongst various rightwing populist 
movements, is that the liberal project promotes an artificial form of society, based on notions of ‘progress’ 





In a conspiracy theory-type of denunciation, liberalism is criticized by rightwing populists as a partisan, 
minority ideology, while human rights are portrayed as instruments to strengthen liberal hegemony. The anti-
liberal critique argues that human rights – as legal norms that promote equality – are highly problematic, in 
that their furtherance results in the undermining of the common good and the protection of partisan interests. 
Human rights become in this reading ‘arbitrary claims, ideologically motivated, made by various political 
groups in blatant disregard of the common good, generously distributed by the legislatures and the courts, 
often contrary to common sense and usually detrimental to public and personal morality’.
25
 The argument is 
clearly a conservative one, in that human rights are portrayed as protecting previously marginalized but now 
privileged groups against the interests of the traditional community and the ‘ordinary people’. One is re-
minded here of Hirschman’s ‘perversity thesis’ (Hirschman 1991), that is, the populist claim is that the liber-
al project achieves the opposite of what it promises (liberation). Rather than leading to a free society for all, 
the rule of law and liberal constitutionalism result in the - ever greater - dominance of distinctive groups in 
society and their ‘oppressive’ cosmopolitan, (neo-)liberal, individualist culture, to the detriment of large 
parts of society, understood as the ‘ordinary people’ with their local culture and mores. 
For Legutko, liberalism portrays a certain hubris in thinking that liberalism is a ‘higher’ solution for socie-
tal problems. Indeed, it places itself in the role of ‘architectonic organizer of society’ and wants to ‘dominate 
by performing the roles of the guardians of the whole of the social system and the judges of the procedural 
rules within the system’ (Legutko 2016: 9). The contextual meaning of this view of liberalism is a strong cri-
tique of the dominant role of political and economic liberalism in post-communist transformation, criticizing 
both the individualist and imitative/mimetic dimension of the first and the strong market-orientation of the 
second.  
In Baudet’s words, the liberal project risks leading to forms of ‘juristocracy’ or what he labels as ‘dicas-
tocracy’, in which legislative power is subjugated to judicial powers, leading to the domination of non-
elected judges who promote the self-interests of a ‘minority of defenders of constitutional democracy’ (Bau-
det 2013: 1626). The worst version of this is perhaps the rule of the judges of the European Court of Human 
Rights, where non-elected, non-national judges ‘impose’ their own ideas on fundamental rights on all mem-
ber states of the Council of Europe. The vagueness of fundamental rights, according to Baudet, allows these 
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judges to issue opinions based on their own specific viewpoints, whereas it ought to be national judges and 
politicians, who, on the basis of their domestic, cultural perspective on human rights, are able to link rights 
with a distinctive political culture and community (Baudet 2013: 1745). According to Bauet, ‘who has the 
power to define what a “fundamental right” means in practice, has the power to impose his political views 
onto others’ (Baudet 2013: 1745).  
For Becchi, the main culprit is the European Union, whose programme is to multiply ‘individual rights’ to 
the detriment of European nations and peoples, thereby ‘cancelling out’ the latter (Becchi 2019: 19). The 
current European constellation and its political, financial and judicial elites – a ‘ “business committee” of 
global economic and financial lobbies – needs to be replaced by a Europe of sovereign states, according to 
Becchi, and hence the ‘rights of states’ and of ‘peoples’ need to be recognized explicitly (Becchi 2019). In 
Le Pen’s version of globalism, democracies are being subjugated to global forces that promote a form of 
‘globalist totalitarianism’. Le Pen’s key target is equally the EU or ‘liberal Europe’, which rules as a bureau-
cracy and bypasses the will of the (French) people (Eltchaninoff 2017: 733). As Le Pen argues, 
 
For too long, the people of the countries in the European Union, and perhaps Americans as well, have had a sense that 
political leaders are not defending their interests but defending special interests instead. There is a form of revolt on the 
part of the people against a system that is no longer serving them but rather serving itself (Reid and Le Pen 2016). 
 






5.4 Legal Fundamentalism 
 
The most forceful dimension of the populist critique is probably its insistence on the ‘fundamentalist’ or 
‘totalitarian’ characteristics of liberalism and the human rights narrative. This fundamentalist dimension 
means for populists that the liberal approach has as its ultimately objective the rational reformatting of socie-
ty on the basis of the idea of individual rights. As observed, populists frequently perceive human rights and 
law in general as not neutral, but rather as instruments of particular groups in society. A recurrent argument 
is that liberalism contains an almost instoppable drive or thrust towards diffusing rights into society (in other 
words, favouring a process of juridification). Legutko, for instance, criticizes liberalism’s lack of weight, lib-
eralism, but at the same time understands liberalism as a comprehensive political project, which uses the law 
and human rights to politicize society and to subject the entire collectivity to liberal norms. In post-
communist societies, liberalism hence emerged as a ‘new wave of a new ideology’ (Legutko 2016: 141), 
which led to a rapid displacement of old ideas with the new liberal ideology or the ‘newest tides of moderni-
ty’ (Legutko 2016: 141). Liberalism – the project of a constellation of liberal, left-leaning, and pro-EU social 
forces – is seen as to endorse a strong programme of ‘political correctness’ which aims at the emancipation 
of society from any kind of exclusion and repression. In doing so, however, so Legutko claims, it turns into a 
project with a totalitarian drive or a form of ‘dictatorship’, which obliges citizens to ‘participate in the great 
collective enterprise, where everyone cooperates with everyone else at all levels and under all circumstances’ 
(Legutko 2016: 101).  
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In Legutko’s view, liberalism leads to the politicization of society or the drive to ‘organize the entire fab-
ric of society, communities became a natural object of, first, critique, and then, open attack, because they 
were seen as power structures of an alien nonliberal and nondemocratic nature’ (Legutko 2016: 96). Law and 
human rights are utilized by liberals to effectively promote this programme. By means of the expansion of 
rights (women’s rights, cultural rights endorsing multiculturalism), entire society becomes ‘formatted’ ac-
cording to liberal ideas of freedom and tolerance. This politicization of society by means of the expansion of 
human rights can be referred to as ‘legal fundamentalism’. As argued by Legutko: 
 
It is the state that should incessantly work to impose and improve cooperation policies by removing all real 
and potential barriers, creating a favorable legal environment, and reshaping public space and education in 
such a way that the people’s minds internalize the rules of politically correct thinking. 
Such undertaking carries a high price. When the state takes over responsibility for the rules of cooperation 
and their enforcement on all layers of society, there will be no limits to its interference in people’s lives. The 
laws it enacts must of necessity be increasingly more detailed and intrusive because what threatens those rules 
and has to be curtailed is believed to be hidden deeply in social practices and human consciousness. The slip-
pery-slope argument, so often used by liberals, is particularly pertinent here. The logic of liberalism is that 
whatever seems to be the most obviously nonpolitical, sooner or later will become political. The logic of de-
mocracy—with its notions of participation, inclusion, and representation—only strengthened this tendency 
(Legutko 2016: 101). 
 
Also Lánczi observes both the lack of weight of liberalism (it is ‘notoriously relativistic’
27
) and the strong 
drive towards expansion in liberalism. He refers to the ‘fundamentalism of [the] modern liberal absolutist 
claim to human rights’ (Lánczi 2015: 82). Lánczi’s view is that ‘democracy’s moral justification is a funda-
mentalist liberal defense of human individual rights’ Once derived from nature, later from reason, today hu-
man rights can be multiplied indiscriminately… Reason itself has become fundamental as such, and its prod-
ucts, like human rights, create secular fundamentalism’ (Lánczi 2015: 78; emphasis added). According to 
Lánczi, the ‘real source’ of human rights is hence ‘human reason pretending to be capable of producing the 
desired blueprint of society’ (Lánczi 2015: 81).  
The Italian Lega equally denounces the distinctive political project behind human rights. As stated by a 
parliamentarian from the Lega in an Italian parliamentary debate on ius soli: 
 
The future and mind-blowing society that you imagine envisages the annihilation of what we have been un-
til now and the facilitation by law of a multicultural society (Rondini, cited in Bulli 2018: 19; emphasis added). 
 
In the view of the Italian philosopher Becchi, it is in particular the connection between the European inte-
gration project and individual human rights that is the problem. In his plea for ‘sovereigntism’, Becchi de-
tects a forward-driving logic of rights: the ‘ “rights” of individuals have multiplied, as a result of universal 
and principled “declarations”, but often without any mechanism for protection whatsoever’ (Becchi 2019: 
18).  For Becchi, ‘euro-globalism needs exactly this: to cancel the peoples and substitute them with singular 
individuals, abstracted from any concrete characteristic, considering them all the same: “abstract” and inter-
changeable individuals, isolated, uprooted, without a language, without a culture and a history’ (Becchi 
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2019: 19-20). The problem is, according to Becchi, that individuals do not exist ‘by themselves’, but ‘live in 
families, communities, peoples, each of them with their own traditions, customs, conventions’ (Becchi 2019: 
18). Rather than individual rights, Becchi proposes the ‘rights of peoples’ (which he outlines in his Charter 
of the Rights of European Peoples).  
The idea that there is a drive towards the eradication of local mores and culture is equally detected by 
Baudet, who relates it, as we have seen above, to ‘egalitarian’ multiculturalism. This means that the exist-
ence of a distinctive Dutch identity is denied by the protagonists of multiculturalism (NB. Baudet cites the 
Dutch Princess Máxima, who publicly stated that ‘the Dutch identity does not exist’ (Baudet 2012: 210). 
Significantly, Baudet identifies a historical impetus in multiculturalism, in that protagonists claim it is im-
possible to stop the progressive process of diffusion of multicultural forms of living together: ‘the Nether-
lands, thus, do not have a realistic option to withdraw from the world and to reverse the multicultural society 
anymore, as one cannot “turn back time” ‘ (Baudet 2012: 212; Cliteur 2004: 169). And, again, the advance-
ment of rights is connected to a decline of community. Baudet argues that whereas originally ‘a citizen 
earned his “rights”… through the fulfillment of duties’. However, ‘[p]artly as a result of the discourse of 
“rights” gaining worldwide momentum, amongst others through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the idea that citizenship implies first and foremost the fulfillment of duties rather than the entitlement to 
rights was lost’ (Baudet 2012: 215; emphasis in original). As we have seen earlier, in his Oikofobie, Baudet 
claims that this distinctive universalistic ‘rights project’ is a political project, pursued by inter alia the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, which endorses a view on human rights as if founded on ‘universal principles 
of justice which do not need an interpretation based on  time and place’ (Baudet 2013: 1745). 
Finally, Paul Cliteur, a Dutch legal scholar, intellectual mentor of Thierry Baudet, and currently member 
of the Dutch senate for the Forum voor Democratie, identified a slightly different, but equally harmful logic 
to rights. In his view, rights are subject to inflation, as rights are continuously produced in the name of some 
new right, in a veritable ‘proliferation of fundamental rights’ (Cliteur 2004: 162). In his view, this leads to a 
loss of democracy, as rights tend to move political matters away from parliament towards courts and deci-
sion-making by judges. But it is equally undermining the Rechtsstaat or constitutional state, as ‘[h]igher law 
is only ‘higher’ due to the fact that there is also law of a lower rank. Everybody in the premier league, no-
body in the premier league’ (Cliteur 2004: 165). Cliteur hence endorses a ‘conservative constitutionalism’. In 
his view, 
 
[M]any of the constitutional changes since the 1960s are a ‘regress’ and not progress. They are a 
regress in the sense that they constitute a threat to the fundamentals of the democratic constitutional 
state (Cliteur 2004: 172).  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
I have argued in the article that contemporary manifestations of right-wing populism in Europe consists to 
an important extent in a reaction to postwar embedded constitutional democracy or ‘constrained democracy’, 
which is grounded in a distinctive form of liberalism, that of legal liberalism. This distinctive legal-liberal 
model has, over the years, become robustly institutionalized in a constellation of juridicial institutions such 
as constitutional courts and human rights regimes, and deeply entangled with supranational judicial institu-
tions. In Western Europe, the ‘project’ of embedded constitutional democracy is importantly represented in 
the project of European integration, whereas in East-Central Europe, it is both the European integration pro-




cess and the post-1989 emergence of liberal democracy that are targets. A core argument in the article is that 
right-wing populists agitate against this embedded constitutional democracy as a regime that promotes exten-
sive juridification and a culture of rights that is deeply grounded in liberal ideas. I have shown that the popu-
list critique contains important conservative dimensions, in its denunciation of the characteristics of artifici-
ality, identity threat, domination and legal fundamentalism in populist discourses. The alternative offered by 
the populists, which might be labelled ‘populist’, ‘illiberal democracy’, as well as ‘Europe of the peoples’, 
stresses popular and national sovereignty, executivism, majoritarianism, the importance of (a distinctively 
conservative interpretation of) national traditions, identity, and history, in what could be understood as a 
communitarian approach. In this, the legal mindset of populists does not reject law as such, but rather criti-
cizes the liberal-legal understanding of constitutionalism and the rule of law, which it understands as exces-
sively elitist, legalistic, internationalist or universalist, and societally invasive. Populists understand the law 
as an extension of the political majority which, in turn, is the alleged expression of national unity. One impli-
cation of the analysis in this article is is that if we want to put a halt to the erosion of liberal democracy by 
populists, we need to take the critique of the ‘juridification of society’, the contested role of human rights, 
the effects of internationalization and ‘globalism’, and the denunciation of the liberal favouring of the parti-
san interests of elites seriously. This would also mean that we need to find ways in which human rights and 
constitutional norms effectively gain meaning for ordinary citizens, rather than being predominantly worth-
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